ecisions in service operations are complex since they involve various interdependent decision-makers (agents) at different hierarchical levels, ranging from customer representatives over account managers to top executives. We formulate a three-level maintenance service problem as a stochastic decision-making model, with an account manager, supervisor, and worker at each of the three levels. The proposed incentive mechanism aligns the interests of lower level agents with the goals of the top agent. The agents' strategic interactions are analyzed game-theoretically and results show that a Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium can be attained given certain organizational properties. Furthermore, we show that local information can be sufficient for organization-wide optimal decisions. In a final step, the three-level model is generalized for multi-level, i.e., multi-organizational-scale, systems.
Introduction
The service industry is the dominant post-industrial sector representing over 60% of GDP and providing jobs to more than one-third of the workforce worldwide (Duignan 2007) . The service industry is multi-faceted and examples of specific industries include healthcare, entertainment, education, finance, and maintenance/repair. In this paper, we focus on decision challenges in a hierarchical maintenance service organization, but the insights gained by our analysis apply to other organizations in the service industry and beyond.
Most machines, such as escalators, elevators, photocopiers, and motor vehicles, require preventive maintenance and/or repairs to sustain their usability. Machine owners, particularly businesses, often outsource their maintenance service needs by committing to service contracts. Satisfaction of business customers with the maintenance service affects the likelihood of contract renewal (Zeithaml et al. 1996) . Thus, customer satisfaction is an important goal for an account manager in the respective service organization. The goals of account managers can be in conflict with the goals of lower level employees, such as maintenance supervisors and maintenance workers. For instance, the supervisor, who is one hierarchical level below the account manager, may care primarily about costs when fulfilling service contracts, and not customer satisfaction. One further organizational level below, a maintenance worker may seek to get his work assignment done with the least amount of effort. The goals of supervisor and worker are in conflict with the account manager's objective to satisfy the customer and to get the service contract renewed.
In this paper, we demonstrate how incentives in a three-level organization can be used to align the interests of lower level agents with the objectives of the highest level agent. We provide agents with decision-making rules in form of analytic equations, which allow them to easily make optimal decisions regarding incentives and their respective courses of action. We extend the three-level system to multiple levels and show that comparatively simple equations are sufficient for optimal decision making in large organizations with multi-organizational-scale agent interactions. In other words, we propose an organizational incentive system that aligns conflicting interests of decision-makers with top management priorities and provide all decision-makers with tools to identify their optimal choices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. In Section 3, the three-level maintenance service problem is described in detail. Section 4 introduces the mathematical three-level model and its notation. The game-theoretical analysis is conducted in Section 5. Section 6 illustrates the decision-makers in hierarchies. Team theory (Marschak and Radner 1972 ) is similar to game theory; the difference being that agents no longer have conflicting interests since they receive identical rewards.
Stackelberg games, where one agent (leader) makes a decision before a second agent (follower), have been used to analyze hierarchical, two-level decision problems (Chang and Ho 1981 , Nie et al., 2006 , van Hoesel, 2008 . Ho (1983) describes a Stackelberg game with incentives for multiple time periods. Luh et al. (1984) extended Ho's control-theoretic analysis to three levels. In our one-period model, agents make their decisions in two stages: in stage one, agents decides on the incentives they offer to their respective subordinate agent. Agents commit to their incentive shares sequentially. In stage two of the decision process, agents make their choices about which action to take knowing the incentive share coming from their superior agent. Agents' choices about their actions are neither observable nor communicated to the other agents. Thus, the agents' interaction in the second stage is modeled as a game with simultaneous decisions.
In principal-agent (PA) theory, incentives play a key role in motivating subordinates. An agent works for a principal -typically the owner and beneficiary of the enterprise -and the agent's actions affect the principal's rewards. To motivate good work, a principal may offer a share of its reward to the agent; see van Ackere (1993) , Klock (2004) , and Zhang et al. (2007) for incentive models in the service industry. In our model, we assume, a reward-dependent incentive payment from the superior to the subordinate agent; see Song and Chen (2006) for a similar model. Itoh (1991) developed a PA model with one principal and two agents. Laffont (1990) and Tirole (1986) examined a three-level hierarchy, consisting of a principal, supervisor, and agent. Their work focuses on contract design and collusion across levels of the organization. Siemsen et al. (2007) examined the use of individual and group incentives. Individual and group incentives are used to motivate effort, knowledge sharing, and helping in groups. The authors' concept of outcome linkages, which is the dependency of one employee's task outcome on another's, can also be found in our model formulation.
To represent the mutual influence of agents on each other, we use dependency graphs (Dolgov and Durfee 2004) initially proposed by computer scientists. Dependency graphs are based on ideas from multi-agent influence diagrams (Koller and Milch 2001) and other graphical models (Kearns et al. 2001 , Guestrin et al. 2003 , which originated from decision analysis (Howard and Matheson 2005) . Dependency graphs capture and graphically illustrate how agents influence each other through rewards and changes in transition probabilities. Wernz and Deshmukh (2007a, 2007b ) developed a two-agent model that the paper on hand extends to a threeagent, and later, multi-agent model. Our paper showcases the capability of multiscale decision theory to solve a challenge in the service science domain. In addition, novel theorems are presented that contribute to multiscale decision theory by showing that compact, closed-form solutions can be derived for hierarchical chains of multiple agents. In general, multiscale decision theory informs organizational designers on how to resolve conflicts of interest between agents in organizations. The theory also provides decision-makers with tools to determine optimal incentive levels and Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium choices. Multiscale decision theory is currently being applied to healthcare systems, financial networks, climate change, homeland security, and technology management.
Motivational Example
We consider an enterprise that produces, installs, and maintains escalators. The maintenance/service division of this enterprise is a three-level hierarchical organization consisting of an account manager, maintenance supervisor, and maintenance worker.
The worker is responsible for preventive maintenance, e.g., lubrication of key bearings and gears. Additionally, the worker is tasked with inspecting the escalators for problems, such as abnormal wear, which could jeopardize the equipment's performance. During the visual inspection, the worker makes the (internal) choice to conduct either a thorough inspection or a superficial inspection. The inspection decision of the worker will result, with a certain probability, in the escalator being under serviced or well serviced. Given a thorough inspection the outcome of a well serviced escalator is more likely than an under serviced one, but both states are possible for either of the worker's decisions. A well serviced escalator is associated with a larger effort by the worker. A superficial inspection is more likely to result in an under serviced state with low effort expended by the worker. The worker seeks to dispense as little effort as possible and thus prefers the superficial inspection over the thorough inspection.
The maintenance supervisor is in charge of the maintenance operation. She is tasked with setting the daily job schedule for the worker. When choosing the schedule, the supervisor must decide between a heavy or light workload for her subordinate. A heavy workload requires the worker to visit and service a large number of jobsites in a day. A heavy workload has a high probability of causing the worker to rush, not spending enough time at each job. The worker having to rush likely results in future malfunction of the escalator, which leads to low service satisfaction of the customer. In contrast, a light workload level allows the worker to spend more time with each customer, which leads with greater probability to high service satisfaction. Again, both states (high and low service satisfaction) are possible given either decision (light and heavy workload). The supervisor is evaluated on a cost per job basis, and her goal is to keep costs low. Therefore, even though service satisfaction will likely suffer, the decision for a heavy workload is preferred by the supervisor as the expected cost is much lower than with the light workload. A well serviced escalator increases the probability of high service satisfaction and high cost; in contrast, an under serviced escalator increases the probability of low service satisfaction and low cost.
At the top level of the enterprise's maintenance/service division is the account manager. The manager is responsible for managing the relationships with the escalator customer. The manager receives a commission for customers renewing their maintenance service contracts. The service satisfaction outcome influences the probability of contract renewal. High service satisfaction increases the probability of contract renewal while low service satisfaction reduces the probability. The manager considers a reward-sharing incentive to align the supervisor's goals with his own. 
Model and Notation
Manager, supervisor, and worker are represented by agents A1, A2, and A3 in the following general model formulation. All three agents are confronted with choosing one of two possible actions from their respective set of actions
In the example introduced in Chapter 3, these decisions correspond to {thorough inspection, superficial inspection} of the worker (agent A3) and {high workload, low workload} of the supervisor (agent A2). The manager (agent A1) does not make a decision; yet, the general model includes the possibility of a decision by the top-level agent.
Depending on its decision, each agent will move to one of two possible states
with probabilities
Specifically, the transition probabilities for agent A1 are ( ) 
These probabilities and rewards describe the agents' state transitions and rewards prior to their interaction with one another. As explained in Section 3, agents affect each other's rewards and transition probabilities through the state to which they move. Agent A1 gives an incentive to agent A2, which depends on agent A1's reward; likewise, agent A2 passes a share of its reward on to agent A3. The incentive payments are the top-down influence in the hierarchical agent interaction. Agents also affect each other bottom-up. Agent A3 influences the probability of agent A2 moving to a particular state, and agent A2 likewise influences the transition probability of agent A1. 
A1
We graphically represent the agent interaction through a dependency graph (Figure 2) , which builds upon a notation by Dolgov and Durfee (2004) . Solid and dashed line arrows indicate that agents influence transition probabilities and rewards of other agents. The dotted line indicates a cost associated with providing a reward.
The reward arrow emanating from agent A1 means that agent A1 makes an incentive payment to agent A2. Agent A1's incentive to agent A2 has an indirect effect on agent A3, which is illustrated through an arrow emanating from the reward arrow between agent A1 and A2. Also, agent A2 directly affects the reward of agent A3. Originating at the same point as the corresponding reward arrow, the dotted line arrow signifies a reward-dependent cost for the agent paying the incentive. The interpretation of the transition probability arrows is accordingly. Agents A1 and A2 are directly affected by their subordinates and agent A3 indirectly influences the transition probabilities of agent A1.
Since agent A1 pays a share of its reward to agent A2, its final reward for reaching a particular state is ( ) ( ) ( )
We refer to x b as the share coefficient. The final reward for agent A2 includes the incentive from agent A1 minus the incentive paid to agent A3, which is expressed as
with share coefficient 2
Next, we describe the effects on the agents' transition probabilities. Starting at the bottom of the hierarchical chain, agent A3's transition probability is not affected. One level up, the transition probability of agent A2 is affected by the state that agent A3 moves to:
The transition probability influence function 2 f , which describes the effect on agent A2, is defined as
with 2 0 c > . The constant x c is referred to as the change coefficient.
The final transition probability of agent A1 is ( ) 
with transition probability influence function 1 f and change coefficient 1 0 c > :
By combining (10)-(12), the final transition probability of agent A1 simplifies to
Since probability values must be within interval [ ] 0,1 , and since change coefficients are positive, the following
( )
In order to create an interesting agent interaction, that requires agents to reason about a non-trivial decision strategy, we make the following assumptions: 
Analysis: Agent Interaction and Optimal Decision-Making
We assume that agents are risk-neutral and rational, i.e., agents maximize their expected utilities or, equivalently, their expected rewards. Agents calculate their and the other parties' expected rewards and choose actions according to the Nash equilibrium. The expected rewards for agents A1, A2, and A3 are calculated as follows: 
with ( 
The following theorems determine the Nash equilibrium for the three agent interaction in stage two of the game.
The Nash equilibrium for the three agent interaction is a strategy profile ( ) 
Condition (25) is always true since each of the factors in the inequality is strictly positive (as defined in (6), (16) and (17)). □ Notice that condition (25) only depends on data from agent A1 and not on any decisions or data from the subordinate agents.
Theorem 2: For a reward share of ( ) Notice that condition (26) only depends on aggregate reward data from agent A1 and A2. Transition probabilities of any agent and data from agent A3 do not affect agent A2's choice.
In the first stage of the two-stage game, agent A1 selects its share coefficient 1 b . Agent A1 selects the smallest coefficient that still guarantees cooperative behavior by its subordinate:
We assume that data (rewards etc.) are such that agent A1 prefers choosing a share coefficient according to (28) over giving no incentive, i.e., 1 0 b = . This assumption is referred to as the participation condition. For details on the participation conditions see Henry and Wernz (2010) . At the next lower level of the hierarchical three-agent chain, Theorem 3 determines agent A3's condition for cooperative behavior. (  )   3  1  2  3  3  1  2  3  1  1  1  1  1  2 | , , | , ,
which results in ( ) (
Term (31) contains 1 b , which we have already determined in equation (28). By inserting (28) into (31), we get inequality (29). □ Again, notice that condition (29) only depends on local, aggregate reward information. Agent A1's parameters do not play a role in agent A3's decision problem. All agent A3 needs to know about agent A1 is that agent A1 is rational, i.e., chooses its dominant decision strategy and an optimal incentive level.
In the context of our example, we have shown that with appropriate incentives, the worker chooses a thorough inspection and the supervisor decides on a light workload, both of which increase the likelihood of contract renewal for the manager. The manager receives a higher expected reward that trickles down the hierarchical chain to the supervisor and worker, who choose the cooperative but initially unfavorable actions. Supervisor and worker knew that through the incentive payments originating from top of the hierarchy, they will be rewarded for their cooperative behavior.
Numerical Example
In this section, we provide a numerical example to illustrate the model. The following table shows the example's parameters and coefficients.
Table 2 Input Data

Rewards
Transition Probabilities Change Coefficients
Manager ( The expected rewards of agents for the example data are given in Table 3 . The left column shows the expected rewards for agents with optimal share coefficients and cooperative actions. The right column represents the no participation case where all share coefficients are zero and lower level agents choose their initially preferred, noncooperative actions. 
Multi-Level Extension
Most organizations have more than three levels. Overseeing the account manager could be a regional sales manager, who again is subordinate to a global sales representative, which in turn reports to the vice president of sales, who is subordinate to the chief executive officer. Recognizing the need for models that can address large organizations, we extend the three-agent model to a hierarchical chain of many agents. Despite the increased complexity, we can still derive analytic solutions that merely require local information for agents' optimal parameter and decision choices. For models with multiple agents on the same hierarchical level, see Wernz and Deshmukh (2010a) . We assume a hierarchical chain of m agents Ax with { } 1, 2,..., x m ∈ . All notation is extended according to the new index set. Except for the agents at the top and bottom of the chain, agents take on the role of both subordinates and superiors as they interact in both directions in the organizational hierarchy. The reward function can be expressed recursively as 
The reward for the last agent in the chain, agent Am, is according to (33) without the factor of ( )
Am does not make an incentive payment.
The transition probability of reaching a particular set of states given all agents' actions is the multiplicative combination of all agents' final transition probability functions. Thus, similar to equation (21) we get
with action index function ( ) x μ , as introduced earlier.
In the analysis of the three-agent model in Section 5, we have seen that the decision and parameters of agent A3 do not influence transition function (27) that determines agent A1's optimal incentive for agent A2. We will show that this result extents to multi-organizational-scale chains. In other words, we demonstrate that limited, local information can be sufficient for chain-wide optimal decisions.
Theorem 4: The optimal incentive levels for agent A2 through A(m-1) are
Proof: For the first two levels (agent A1 and A2), we receive the same results as before: 
in (29) for ( ) { } 1, 2 x μ ∈ . For the next lower level, the evaluation of 
and agents will choose the Pareto-efficient share coefficient according to (35) . □ Agent Ax selects the optimal share coefficient value, such that agent A(x+1) chooses the cooperative action, and merely needs to evaluate its own private information and the aggregate reward information of agent Ax, its immediate superior. Chain-wide optimal and cooperative behavior is possible with local interaction and information. To avoid free-riding, agents commit to the share coefficient in a bottom-up sequence, and -provided that the participation constraint is met -all agents will choose non-zero share coefficients leading to chain-wide, cooperative behavior that is aligned with the goals of the top-most agent.
Conclusions
This paper presents a three-agent, hierarchical decision-making model for a maintenance service operation. The model is extended for multi-level organizations with any number of hierarchical levels. The agent interaction is graphically represented through a dependency graph from which an algebraic formulation of the problem is derived. A game-theoretic analysis determines the agents' equilibrium decision strategies. The model's results provide guidelines for decision-makers in hierarchical organizations on (1) optimal incentive-levels, (2) information and communication requirements, and (3) optimal courses of actions. Furthermore, organizational designers are informed about organizational structures in which agents can coordinate incentives autonomously with little information and communication needs.
Provided that the participation condition is met, an agent's optimal course of action is to communicate necessary information, share rewards, and select cooperative actions supporting its superiors. By exchanging limited and aggregated private information, agents can determine optimal, two-stage decision strategies. In stage one, agents choose optimal incentives (share coefficients); in stage two, agents select their best courses of action. As a result of their cooperative behavior, agents receive higher expected rewards compared to myopically selfish, i.e., non-cooperative, behavior.
In the context of our service operations example, the maintenance worker carries out a thorough inspection of the equipment, even though a superficial inspection seems more appealing at first. The maintenance supervisor sets a light workload level for the worker, which leads more likely to a high cost for the supervisor, but also to high customer satisfaction. The account manager benefits from high customer satisfaction through an increase in the customer's likelihood to renew their service contract. A share of the manager's higher expected reward is passed down to both agents providing incentives for them to behave cooperatively.
